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di·no·saur
noun \ˈdī-nə-ˌsȯr\
1: one of many reptiles that lived on Earth millions of years ago
2: someone or something that is no longer useful or current: an
obsolete or out-of-date person or thing
3: one that is impractically large, out-of-date, or obsolete.1

I. WHAT IF
What if dinosaurs had adapted to meet changing environmental
circumstances? History shows that this was not to be. The passing
of dinosaurs has become the defining measure of a failure to adapt.
Their fate: extinction.
This same fate potentially awaits the Social Security Disability
Insurance program. On March 14, 2013, Joyce Manchester, the thenChief, Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) Long-Term Analysis
Unit, testified before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the
Committee on Ways and Means.2 Her prognosis was dire:
The DI program’s rapid expansion and the projected gap between
its spending and dedicated revenues in the future raise questions
about the financial sustainability of the program. Since 2009, the
program has been paying out more in annual benefits than it receives
* The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and not those of
the United States Government, the Social Security Administration or any
component thereof. The author teaches as a member of the adjunct faculty at the
University of Tulsa, College of Law; has prior service as United States Magistrate
Judge, Northern District, Oklahoma; and currently serves as a federal
Administrative Law Judge.
1
Dinosaur, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/dinosaur.
2
The Social Security Disability Insurance Program Before the Subcomm. on
Social Security Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (testimony of
Joyce Manchester, Chief, Long-Term Analysis Unit, Cong. Budget Office).
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43995_DITestimony.pdf [hereinafter Manchester Testimony].
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in taxes and in interest on the balances in its trust fund.9 CBO
projects that the DI trust fund will be exhausted in 2016, nearly 20
years before the projected exhaustion of the trust fund for the Social
Security retirement program.3
Ms. Manchester made yet another observation regarding Social
Security trust fund operations – one likely unknown to most
Americans: “If a trust fund’s balance falls to zero and current
revenues are insufficient to cover the benefits that are specified in
law and administrative expenses, SSA [the Social Security
Administration] has no legal authority to pay full benefits when they
are due.”4The Congressional Budget Office also projected that the
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) fund would reach
exhaustion in 2038.5 If, as was done in 1994, funds are re-directed
from the OASI fund to the DI fund, in effect combining the two, the
projected exhaustion for both programs is 2034.6
Is this the future of the Social Security Disability Insurance
program? Is it, like the dinosaurs, doomed to extinction? If so, at
what price? Are steps being taken to address the issues?
Consider the following exchange between Congressman Darrell
Issa of California and then-Acting Commissioner Carolyn Colvin in a
June 11, 2014 hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform.7
Chairman Issa:
“Do you believe that Congress needs to give greater authority,
not greater money, greater authority, to fire, to reform, to review if
3

Id. at n. 9. “Federal trust funds, including those for Social Security,
essentially constitute an accounting mechanism for tracking the relationship
between a program’s spending and the revenues that are dedicated to that program.
In a given year, the sum of a fund’s receipts along with the interest that is credited
on previous balances, minus spending for benefits and administrative costs, equals
a trust fund’s surplus or deficit.” Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Social Security Testimony Regarding Oversight of Federal Disability
Programs Before the Oversight and Government Reform Comm., 113th Cong.
(2014) (testimony of Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Comm’r, SSA),
http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/testimony_061114.html.
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you are in fact going to represent the American people's best interest
of their tax dollars?”
Ms. Colvin:
“I am not prepared to answer that question. I think that I would
have to look at what the Merit Systems Review Board challenges are.
I think that perhaps there could be some improvements there.”
Chairman Issa:
“Ma'am, I asked you a question and I just want the answer to the
question. You cannot, here today, if I hear you correctly, identify
one area of authority or flexibility — not money; authority or
flexibility — that would enhance your ability to protect the American
people's taxpayer dollars?”
Ms. Colvin:
“I would be very happy to give you a thoughtful response at a
later time on that.”
Chairman Issa:
Instead of recommending reforms to the broken and wasteful
disability appeals process your only suggestion was to express
support for the recommendation of Rep. Gerald Conolly that
Congress reallocate the payroll tax in order to fund the disability trust
fund after 2016 when it will be bankrupt. A bailout of the disability
fund after at least a decade of serious agency mismanagement and at
the expense of the SSA retirement program, without meaningful
reforms to a broken appeals process and disability re-evaluation
process, is not a responsible solution.
_______
Chairman Issa emphasized the need for fundamental reformation
of the disability process. He sought to understand the past in order to
guide the agency’s future action, saying, “it is important that that the
agency understand the full scope of the problem.”8 Is this just
political “gotcha,” or does it signal a more significant substantive
inquiry?

8

Id.
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The Acting Commissioner’s responses to Chairman Issa’s request
for solutions also raised questions, not only in the general absence of
a “big-picture” response, but in the specific absence of a
comprehensive, forward-looking policy, able to adapt to changing
circumstances. At stake is the formulation of a policy protocol,
which anticipates future changes rather than assesses blame for past
mistakes. This article focuses upon the hearings and appeals process
as a critical component of the Title II Disability Insurance (DI)
program. It is here that the program has its highest public profile. It
is here that Americans seek not only help but also justice.9
This article proposes a simple theme. While many issues plague
the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security
Income programs, only reform of the hearings and appeals process
can solve the decades-long (and growing) hearings backlog. Only
then, can the remaining questions regarding the solvency of the DI
trust fund be meaningfully addressed. As it now stands, the ongoing
backlog of pending hearings and appeals feeds the twin plagues of
rising costs and increasing delay. These are the very issues that

9
Other significant questions also arise in any examination of the DI program,
not the least of which are the criteria by which disability benefits are awarded.
Other issues are equally important, many of which are structural in nature and
concern program implementation. These include revision of the MedicalVocational Guidelines, which, at present, among other assumptions, presumes that
a fifty year old, limited to unskilled sedentary work (sit-down jobs) would be
unable to find a significant number of such jobs within the national or regional
economies and is, therefore, “disabled” – even though he/she can, in fact, work at a
sit-down job. Other questions are equally telling. Such as:

1. Why are disability applications from persons who seek Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act
measured by the same legal standard as persons who seek Disability Insurance
Benefits under II? In many instances, SSI applicants have little or no meaningful
or sustained work as adults and so the declared inability to work rings hollow when
measured against those with a lifetime of work.
2. Why are attorney fees predicated on the passage of time (past due benefits)
and not expertise? Why does the Agency reward attorneys with a larger attorney
fee the longer it takes to decide a case when there is a rising backlog of pending
hearings, causing ever-increasing delays in the hearings and appeals process?
These are but a few of the many questions now being asked of the DI Program.
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drove the federal courts in the passage of the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 (CJRA).10
What follows is an overview of the now-antiquated Social
Security Disability hearings and appeals process – a process that has
not substantively changed since the inception of the DI program; nor
with the later adoption of the SSI program in 1972. As such, the
system is a “dinosaur” – one that yet survives. In considering a nom
de guerre for this system, only one is fitting: the “King of
Administrative Adjudications,” or Adjudicasaurus Rex.
Can he be saved?

II. ADJUDICASAURUS REX
Adjudicasaurus Rex is the statutorily created hearings and appeals
function of the Social Security Administration, established by the
Social Security Act.11 An appeal from an underlying administrative
determination by the Social Security Administration is governed in
part by 20 C.F.R. §404.900 (a)(3) which provides: “If you are
dissatisfied with the reconsideration determination, you may request
a hearing before an administrative law judge.”
Adjudicasaurus Rex claims the title of King of Administrative
Adjudications, long outmoded, surviving still, despite growing
backlogs, ever more revelations of fraud and abuse and a legal
landscape whose evolutionary course has long since deigned that
creatures such as Adjudicasaurus Rex should be no longer. Its tale is
told yet today in the hallowed halls of Congress and in the
courtrooms of the nation. It is a tale of woe, for within its workings

10

Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH & LEE L.
REV. 89, 90 (Winter 1993). “Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act during
1990 because of mounting concern over abuse in civil litigation, particularly in the
discovery process; the growing costs of resolving civil lawsuits; and decreasing
federal court access in those cases. For a decade and a half, many federal judges,
led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, had contended that the federal judiciary was
experiencing a litigation explosion and increasing discovery and litigation abuse.”
Id.
11
42 U.S.C. §205(b) (1981).
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lies the timeworn ways of bygone times.12 While Adjudicasaurus
Rex appears strong and enduring, he lacks the ability, innate or
otherwise, to adapt to an ever-dynamic social-legal environment and
shall soon pass as a legacy of national history – a victim of a failure
to evolve. The agency has not sought to change an adjudicatory
model that has subsisted in its present form for more than 50 years.
Given the shortcomings of earlier solutions, the present backlog
augurs for change.
When first devised, the hearings process was conceived as “nonadversarial”, adopting an inquisitorial jurisprudence akin to that
found in judicial systems in continental Europe, this in response to
the fact that few persons were represented by counsel.13 Professor
Robert M. Viles undertook a comprehensive study of the Social
Security disability system in 1968.14 He described the 1968 hearing
procedure in the words of one [then] hearing examiner [now,
administrative law judge] as follows:
In 99% of the cases, people come in without any representation.
It is my job to represent those people when they come in. It seems
strange, but we use the terminology that we “wear three hats.” We
put on the first hat, and we represent the claimant, we present all the
testimony on his behalf, and drag it out of him by questioning. We
then represent the government, the Social Security Administration,
and search the law--that's the second hat. We search our minds, and
we search whatever other records are available, we search the
12

Robert M. Viles, The Social Security Administration Versus the Lawyers . . .
and Poor People Too, Part II, 40 MISS. L. J. 24, 59 (1968).
Dean Robert M. Viles, in his thorough 1968 Mississippi Law Journal article,
describing the Social Security Administration, noted that lawyers did not have a
role under the Social Security Act:
The original Social Security Act of 1935 was silent on the
question of representation of claimants for benefits. In 1939,
however, §206 was enacted with the following explanation:
‘While it is not contemplated that the services of an agent or
attorney will be necessary in presenting the vast majority of
claims, the experience of other agencies would indicate that
where such services are performed the fees charged therefor
should be subject to regulation by the Board [now
Administration], and it is so provided.
Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
13
Id.
14
Id.
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evidence, and we present the best case that the government has. Then
we turn around and put on the third hat, and we decide which
evidence is most favorable, and in whose behalf.15
But for one element, this forty-seven year-old description of the
disability hearings process from 1968 precisely mirrors that of
today’s hearings. The variance? As contrasted with claimant
representation in 1968, in today’s world more than 80% of all
claimants are represented, most by attorneys.16 This constitutes a
dramatic change in the legal milieu, effectively rendering the current,
longstanding hearings process obsolete.
Designed for a time when few persons were represented, the
current hearings and appeals process at Title 20 CFR Part 404
§900(b) describes itself in contrast to the adversarial court system, as
“informal” and “nonadversarial:”
In making a determination or decision in your case, we conduct
the administrative review process in an informal, nonadversary
manner. In each step of the review process, you may present any
information you feel is helpful to your case . . . You may present the
information yourself or have someone represent you, including an
attorney.17
Today, the overwhelming presence of lawyers in the disability
appeals system dramatically changes the hearings dynamic, for
American lawyers are advocates, trained to operate in a highly
structured legal milieu in which the descriptor, “non-adversarial,”
simply does not apply.18 The American adversarial system of justice

15

Viles, supra note 12 at 40-41.
See, e.g. Claimant Representatives Barred from Practicing Before the Social
Security Administration, A-12-07-17057, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. (Sept. 2007), http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-1207-17057_0.pdf [hereinafter A-12-07-17057] (showing that in fiscal year 2006, of
the 559,000 claims heard by Administrative law judges, 439,000 were represented
by attorney and non-attorney advocates, representing claimants in almost 80% of
all claims appealed. Examined another way, the OIG notes, “[i]n FY 2006,
approximately 26,000 attorneys and 5,000 non-attorneys represented claimants
before ODAR.”). Id.
17
20 C.F.R. §404.900 (b) (2015).
18
See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary
System, 64 INDIANA L.J. 301 (1989), who writes: “The hallmark of American
adjudication is the adversary system. The virtues of the adversary system, are so
16
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contemplates two opposing parties, each seeking to defeat the other,
made possible only with the adoption of comprehensive rules of
procedure, evidence, and legal ethics, all designed to ensure a fair
and impartial trial.19
Given the resulting and expected high levels of advocacy, the
adversarial system is structured to restrict ‘win-at-all costs’
conduct,20 all the while encouraging advocacy – all within the
bounds of a fair trial.21 The adversarial system of justice is framed
by rules of ethical conduct, bounded in both the civil and criminal
courts by highly specific rules of procedure and evidence, bolstered
further by ancillary procedures designed to foster alternative dispute

deeply engrained in the American legal psyche that most lawyers do not question
it.” Id.
19
Id. at 304-05.
Once the evidence is presented, it must be interpreted,
leaving room for further indeterminacy. These problems with
reconstructing the past are a primary reason for the existence of
burdens of proof. Each party to a dispute must try to persuade the
trier of fact that his version of the facts corresponds to truth, and
someone must bear the risk of nonpersuasion.
Id. (Citations omitted.)
20
Id. at 307-08.
A third goal of a procedural system is behavior modification.
Behavior modification is, of course, significantly tied to the
substantive legal rules that are being applied, but the procedural
system itself promotes this goal by providing sanctions for
behavior that is disapproved in the substantive rules. All
procedural systems do this to some extent because substantive
rules that emerge from litigation, coupled with the likelihood of
sanctions, affect how non-parties behave in the future.
Id. (Citations omitted.)
21
See e.g., Preamble and Scope, Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model
_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_s
cope.html, providing in-part:
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually
harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a
lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the
same time assume that justice is being done.
Id.
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resolution.22 Codified by a variety of state and federal laws,
including the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA)23 as well as the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998,24 among others,
ancillary procedures within the adversarial judicial system
contemplate early resolution of claims by means other than trial.25
As a result, the overwhelming majority of claims filed in the federal
civil courts are resolved before trial.26 Not so in the antiquated
Social Security system of hearings and appeals, where the
overwhelming majority of claims filed are tried before an
administrative law judge. See, infra, Figures 1 and 2.

22

See Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional State of Court-Connected
ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 873 (2012), who observes:
Obviously, there is much to commend in court-connected
mediation and what it offers to people caught up in disputes . . .
Proponents of court-connected mediation can also point to a
multitude of accomplishments. For example, and most strikingly,
many cases settle in mediation. For the vast majority of those
cases, litigants express satisfaction with the process and indicate
that they had the opportunity to express themselves, that the other
parties heard them, that they had input into the outcome, and that
they view the process as fair.
Id.
23
The Civil Justice Reform Act , 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2013).
24
28 U.S.C. §651 (2013).
25
Id. at n.1, (citing JENNIFER E. SHACK, RESOL. SYS. INST., BIBLIOGRAPHIC
SUMMARY OF COST, PACE, AND SATISFACTION STUDIES OF COURT-RELATED
MEDIATION PROGRAMS, 7 (2d ed. 2007)) (stating “58% of unlimited cases and 71%
of limited cases settled as a result of mediation.”). Roselle L. Wissler, The
Effectiveness of Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 55, 58 (2004) (reporting that “[m]ost studies reported a settlement rate
between 47 and 78 percent.”).
26
See e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and
Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, J. OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD, 659, 664 (Nov. 2004) (noting that between 1987 and
1996, 2,357,591 legal actions were filed in the federal courts. Of that number, only
74,253 or 3% were tried to conclusion…).
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Figure 1

Source: Social Security Administration 27
Figure 1 depicts National Hearing Decisions since 2008; while
Figure 2 indicates National Hearing Receipts or filings during this
same period.

27

Hearings and Appeals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa.gov/appeals/#a0=3 (last
visited, May 25, 2015).
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Figure 2

Source: Social Security Administration 28
In Fiscal Year 2014, 810,715 Requests for Hearing (before an
Administrative Law Judge) were filed by Social Security disability
claimants. Of that number, 680,963 hearing decisions were issued.
The significance? Eighty-four percent of all Requests for Hearing
were tried, as contrasted with less than 10% in the federal courts.
During this same period, between 2008 and the present, the
agency has increased the size of its corps of administrative law
judges. This has not, however, slowed the increasing backlog of
pending hearings. See, infra, Figure 5. The issue is not, therefore,
the productivity of judges, who are more productive than at any other
time but is, instead, a reflection of the inherent inability of the current
adjudicatory system to successfully adapt to a fundamentally altered
legal environment.

28

Id.





  "

    

13

III. ADJUDICASAURUS REX ENDANGERED!
Adjudicasaurus Rex thrives within a complex multifactorial29
legal climate his genesis found within the environs of a vast
antediluvian tidal expanse, bounded by the caverns of Woodlawn,
Maryland, the plains of Falls Church, Virginia and the bogs of
Washington, D.C.30 Despite his birth in the nation’s capital, he
roams the nation, seeking succor within 168 hearing offices and ten
regional offices.31 Within these offices he finds his true environs, the
cloistered spaces of his evolving habitat – the dangerous evolutionary
realms of the legal landscape. It is here that Adjudicasaurus Rex has
lived; and it is here he now finds what may be his imminent demise.
The Social Security disability appeals system, structured under the
Social Security Act and established as the Office of Disability
Adjudication and Review (ODAR) is the unchallenged “King” of all
administrative adjudicatory systems. In 2015, ODAR is home to
more than 1,500 federal administrative law judges (ALJs), each
appointed under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA).32
The Commissioner of Social Security is charged with hearing and
deciding matters arising under Title II and Title XVI of the Social
Security Act. Title 42 United States Code (USC) § 405(a) calls for
the Commissioner “to make findings of fact, and decisions as to the
rights of any individual applying for a payment under this [title].”

29

Id., mul·ti·fac·tor \-ˈfak-tər\ : having, involving, or produced by a variety of
elements or causes.
30
Adam Karlin, From Virginia through Maryland and up to Delaware, the
Eastern Shore comprises a string of protected wetlands and preserved beaches,
interspersed with resort towns, WASHINGTON, D.C., CITY GUIDE, 232 (May 1,
2010).
31
Hearings Office Locator, Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, SOC.
SEC.ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/ho_locator.html (last visited
May 2, 2015).
32
Hearings and Appeals, Administrative Law Judge Disposition Data, SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/appeals/DataSets/03_ALJ_Disposition_Data.html. (last visited
May 2, 2015).
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The APA recites that “the agency” or “one or more administrative
law judges appointed under section 3105 of this title” “shall preside
at the taking of evidence.”33
The role of the administrative law judge stands as one of the
critically important provisions of the APA, ensuring a separation of
function between judges and others within the agency, “by separating
those in the agency who investigate and prosecute from those who
hear and decide . . . APA hearings are conducted by independent
administrative law judges, who are not subject to agency control.
ALJs are not permitted to "consult a person or party on a fact in
issue, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate."34
Decisional independence by the administrative judiciary is a
recognized hallmark of the APA, ensuring fundamentally fair and
impartial decision-making through due process of law in
administrative adjudications.
Despite APA protections, the Social Security Administration
stands on the brink of a convergence of circumstances which may,
absent fundamental corrective action, lead the American people to
lament the fate of the nation’s preeminent disability program,
examining the bones of its bureaucratic remains in future histories,
much like a fossilized skeleton of some great dinosaur of ages past.
This is not so much a doomsday prediction, as it is a factual
assessment.35
33

5 U.S.C. §556(a).
Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32
TULSA L. J. 203, 208 (1996). See also the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 554.
35
See,, e.g., Javier Meseguer, Outcome Variation in the Social Security
Disability Insurance Program: The Role of Primary Diagnoses, SOC. SEC.
BULLETIN (Vol. 73 No. 2, 2013) who writes:
From 1970 through 2009, the number of beneficiaries in the
DI [Disability Insurance] program more than tripled, while DI
expenditures increased by almost seven times in inflationadjusted figures (Congressional Budget Office, 2010). According
to the Social Security Advisory Board (2012a), that expansion
can be traced to several factors in addition to an increase in the
general population.
34

One factor has been an increase in the share of lower
mortality impairments with earlier onset (such as musculoskeletal
and mental disorders). Applicants with those types of
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Like the once-dominant dinosaur, the Social Security disability
program is described by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark 1971 case, Richardson v. Perales36 as encompassing “vast
workings . . .” And, like the dinosaur, the question is one of survival
or extinction – an issue now in doubt with the disclosure that the
disability insurance benefits (DIB) program is insolvent, destined to
exhaust the Title II disability trust fund in 2016, with little or no
action taken by the agency to halt the downward slide.37

impairments tend to enter the program at younger ages and
remain as beneficiaries for longer periods of time. Id.
Another factor has been an increase in female labor force
participation. The rapid pace at which women have joined the
ranks among workers has considerably expanded the pool of
applicants. Indeed, the gender composition of beneficiaries today
is much closer to that of the population at large. Id.
A third factor has been an increase in earnings replacement
rates. Rising income inequality coupled with the average wage
indexing of benefits has increased the portion of potential
earnings replaced by DI benefits. Younger low-skilled workers in
particular have experienced the highest increase in the value of
DI benefits at a time of reduced demand for their labor.
Exacerbating the gap between potential earnings and disability
benefits is a reduction in private health insurance coverage.
Eventual access to Medicare after 2 years on the DI rolls may
provide an additional enticement to apply. Id.
36
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
37
Manchester Testimony, supra note 2. Joyce Manchester made plain the
impending crisis now facing the Social Security disability program: “Since 2009,
the program has . . . pa[id] out more annual benefits than it receive[d]” in dedicated
revenues. These revenues come primarily from the Social Security payroll tax. In
2012, “[t]otal [Disability Insurance (DI)] expenditures were $135 billion,” or 0.87
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while the program’s dedicated tax
revenues totaled $102 billion, or 0.65 percent of GDP. In 2023, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) projects the program’s spending will be 0.82 percent of GDP,
and dedicated tax revenues will be 0.66 percent of GDP. The CBO further projects
that “the DI Trust fund will be exhausted in 2016, nearly 20 years before the
projected exhaustion of the [Social Security’s Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
(OASI)] trust fund for the Social Security retirement program.” Jeffrey S. Wolfe &
Dale ing, Through the Disability Looking Glass: A Considered Response to
Professor Pashler’s Wild Social Security Hare, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 523, 527
(2014) (Manchester Testimony, supra note 2).
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Overall, the numbers are telling. “Total DI [Disability Insurance]
expenditures were $135 billion,” or 0.87% of gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2012, while the program’s dedicated tax revenues totaled
only $102 billion, or 0.65% of GDP.38 In other words, the system is
now paying out more in disability benefits than it is taking in, in tax
revenues. See, Figure 3. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
projects that the Disability Insurance trust fund will be ‘in the red’ in
2016, approximately 20 years before the projected end of Social
Security’s Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund,
which pays for the Social Security retirement program.39
Figure 3

Source: Congressional Budget Office40
[T]he Board of Trustees of the Social Security Trust Funds, in its
2013 Annual Report, projected that the reserves in the DI Trust Fund,
which have declined since 2009, will continue . . .to be depleted in
2016. At that time, continuing income to the DI Trust Fund would be
38

The Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Social Security H. Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(March
14,
2013),
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43995_DITestimony.pdf [hereinafter Manchester Hearings] (testimony of Joyce Manchester,
Chief, Long-Term Analysis Unit).
39
Id.
40
Report: The 2013 Long-Term Projections for Social Security: Additional
Information, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,(December 17, 2013),
http://cbo.gov/publication/44972.
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sufficient to pay only 80 percent of scheduled DI benefits. Absent an
act of Congress, the Social Security Act does not permit further
funding or allow SSA to make benefit payments from funds other
than the Trust Funds. Consequently, if the Social Security Trust Fund
reserves become depleted, current law would effectively prohibit
SSA from paying full Social Security benefits.41
Figure 4

Source:
Office
Administration 42

of

Inspector

General,

Social

Security

The causes are many, but even a cursory statistical review of the
Title II disability insurance program reveals fundamental issues –
both procedural and substantive – crying out for resolution.
That this is so, is evident from recent history. The General
Accounting Office (GAO), now, the “Government Accountability
Office,” has, over a period of years conducted periodic studies of the
Social Security Administration and its handling of the disability
appeals caseload. It notes in 1996 that the “[t]he Social Security
41

The Social Security Administration’s Ability to Prevent and Detect
Disability Fraud, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.3 (September,
2014),
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/testimony/SSA's%20Ability%20to%20Prevent
%20and%20Detect%20Disability%20Fraud_0.pdf.
42
Id.
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Administration (SSA) operates the nation’s largest programs
providing cash benefits to people with severe long-term
disabilities.”43 The GAO further observed that, “[d]espite numerous
studies of SSA’s disability programs and continued agency attempts
to improve the disability appeals process, between 1985 and 1995,
OHA’s pending case backlog—the number of appealed cases waiting
for a decision—grew from 107,000 to 548,000, and case-processing
time increased from 167 to 350 days.”44
Given the foregoing, absent change, Adjudicasaurus Rex seems
destined for extinction, with increasing delays, rising numbers of
claimants and exhaustion of the DI Trust Fund – the King of
Administrative Adjudications brought down by the inability to
effectively address the claims and appeals of literally millions of
Americans45 in the company of thousands of lawyers and
representatives. It is no secret, though not for some reason obvious,
that Adjudicasaurus Rex’s habitat – the legal landscape – has
changed, no longer the vacant fields of the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s.
Of late, Adjudicasaurus Rex’s environment is quite different from
earlier times – inhabited by a new species – perhaps best termed,
Velociraptor advocatasaurus – lawyers and representatives –
abounding in greater numbers, as never before, in an environment
which did not originally contemplate their presence. These recentlyarrived new-actors-in-the-system migrated from their traditional
habitats, seeking new venues wherein they might flourish. In
coming, they now endanger Adjudicasaurus Rex, who ponderously
lumbers, surrounded now by the more numerous and agile
Advocatasaurus.

43

Social Security Disability: Backlog Reduction Efforts Under Way;
Significant Challenges Remain, GAO/HEHS-96-87, UNITED STATES GEN
ACCOUNTING OFFICE (July, 1996), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155557.pdf.
44
Id.
45
Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program,
CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET
OFFICE
(July
16,
2012),
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43421. The CBO observes “[t]he Disability
Insurance program provided benefits to 8.3 million disabled workers in 2011. By
2022, CBO projects, the program will provide benefits to over 10 million disabled
workers and spending on benefits will exceed $190 billion.” Id.
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IV. ADJUDICASAURUS REX AND THE PRINCIPLES OF EVOLUTION
In speaking to the need for a new system of administrative
adjudications for Social Security, the system must be recognized for
what it is. Social Security’s system of hearings and adjudications is,
in social-legal terms, a mass social justice welfare system. That
label, standing alone, fails to describe the intricate workings of the
system.
In fact, Social Security’s system of administrative
adjudications is a highly complex undertaking involving hundreds if
not thousands of variables. By its very nature, the number and effect
of these variables is in constant flux, made all the more difficult with
the introduction of lawyers and non-lawyer advocates. The entrance
of lawyers and non-lawyer advocates fundamentally changes the
adjudicatory system simply because the behaviors of such actors
were not factors originally considered when the jurisprudence was
devised.
“The original intent of the framers of the Social Security Act in
their description of administrative decisionmaking – including
adjudication – is, in the words of Paul Verkuil, made clear “[i]n a
1940 statement [by] the [Social Security] Board . . . [and describes
anticipated decisionmaking under the new Social Security Act] . . . in
terms of ‘simplicity and informality’ as well as ‘accuracy and
fairness’. . . The decision model proposed by the Social Security
Board was designed to make an enormously complex program work
at low cost and with substantial public satisfaction.”46 The goal
identified is transparency in decisionmaking with sustained public
approval in meeting the need for clear and timely administrative
responses. Unfortunately, the lofty goals of the 1940’s – to meet the

46

Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COL. L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1978).
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needs of a nation poised on the brink of a new age, now lie buried,
overwhelmed by numbers once not thought possible.”47
This is not to say there are no regulations that concern
representatives. Title 20 Part 404, Code of Federal Regulations
Section 1740 et seq. generally addresses the conduct of
representatives (lawyers and non-lawyers alike); but review of the
overall jurisprudential scheme fails to find those procedural mandates
and safeguards present in every other Anglo-American judicial
system. Indeed, the reasons articulated by the Social Security Board
in 1940 makes this clear: the goal was “simplicity and informality” –
terms not generally associated with lawyers in the context of
adjudications.
Examined through the lens of principles of biological evolution
the following becomes readily apparent. Evolution occurs in a
dynamically changing legal environment just as in a changing
biological environment. When examining the evolutionary course of
the dinosaurs, the inability of the dinosaur to adapt signaled the end
of that age. The difference here is a question of choice—a choice the
dinosaurs did not themselves share. To act, or not in the face of the
demise of Adjudicasaurus Rex is the singular (albeit, largely
unappreciated) question facing the American people. Failure to
acknowledge the fundamental changes, which now dramatically
affect the legal milieu, is tantamount to a failure to adapt.
From an evolutionary perspective, that Adjudicasurus Rex is to be
a victim of the very environment from which he springs is no
accident of circumstance. Paleontologists note the critical role of
environment in species survival: “the strongest predictive factors of
extinction . . . were both the percentage of a genus's habitat that was
lost when the sea level dropped and a genus's ability to tolerate
broader ranges of temperatures. Groups that lost large portions of
their habitat as ice sheets grew and sea levels fell, and those that had
always been confined to warm tropical waters, were most likely to go
extinct as a result of the rapid climate change.48 Modern theory goes

47

Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications, 64
ADMIN. L. REV. 379, 383-84 (2012).
48
Kevin Laland, Tobias Uller, Marc Feldman, et al, Does Evolutionary Theory
Need A Rethink?, NATURE (October 8, 2014), http://www.nature.com/news/doesevolutionary-theory-need-a-rethink-1.16080.
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further, proposing extended evolutionary synthesis (EES), postulating
that:
“[O]rganisms are constructed in development, not simply
‘programmed’ to develop by genes. Living things do not evolve to fit
into pre-existing environments, but co-construct and coevolve with
their environments, in the process changing the structure of
ecosystems.” 49
Such is the circumstance now facing Adjudicasaurus Rex. Had
he evolved in response to changing environmental conditions, he
would have not only adapted, but by virtue of his own change, would
have effected yet further adaptation in the legal environment itself.
Put simply, in the manifestation of his own adaptive response, he too
becomes an agent of change. This concept – of elements within a
system seen as exerting a systemic contributory influence affecting
the very nature of the system itself—is not new. Professor Manfred
Laublicher, Ph.D., of the Laubichler Lab, within the School of Life
Sciences at Arizona State University, studies “the theory of Complex
Adaptive Systems (CAS).”50 He writes:
CAS [Complex Adaptive Systems] can be found across many
different areas (from living and social to economical and

49

Id.(emphasis added).
Manfred Laublicher, Theory of Developmental Evolution and Complex
Adaptive Systems, THE LAUBLICHER LAB, DEVELOPMENTAL EVOLUTION ARIZONA
STATE UNIVERSITY, http://devo-evo.lab.asu.edu/?q=theory (last visited May 2,
2015). He notes further:
As a consequence of the numbers of agents and dynamics of
CAS, their behaviors play out in an interactive space that has a
very high number of dimensions and degrees of freedom. Until
recently, systems of such high dimensionality were not tractable
to human understanding, but recent advances in computation and
modeling of CAS are creating the tools to manage, mine and
manipulate the vast amount of data needed to describe such high
dimensionalities. All efforts to characterize and understand CAS
include advanced computational sciences and modeling to
capture systems-based multidimensionality and new, responsive
models and constructs, for experimental analysis. Although a
single prescriptive statement that embraces all categories of CAS
is difficult, it is increasingly possible to think about (and model)
their fundamental shared properties; complexity, robustness and
adaption.
Id.
50
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technological systems) and are variable in form. Therefore, they are
best captured by identifying the common features that describe their
essential elements and convergent behaviors. CAS comprise many
“agents” that exhibit independent properties and behaviors but work
together to produce emergent properties that cannot be predicted by
isolated understanding of these interacting agents/components.51
“One of the defining features of CAS, whether natural,
technological, economic, social/cultural or biological, is that they are
in large measure the product of adaptive co-evolution with their
environment.”52 Despite an adjudicatory structure described by a
complex system of disability laws, regulations and court rulings,
literally affecting millions of Americans, Adjudicasaurus Rex – the
disability adjudicative system, has neither evolved nor adapted to the
changing legal environment. In this system, the theory of Complex
Adaptive Systems postulates an evolutionary adaptation in response to
changes in the legal landscape, which for the adjudicative system, is
a primary integral element. Here, there has been little or no
adaptation to the rising presence of Velociraptor advocatasaurus –
lawyers and representatives – and the resulting increase in numbers
of claims and Requests for Hearings.

V. TWO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES NOW REQUIRE ADAPTATION
Two critical evolutionary milestones mark now-evident changes
to the disability legal landscape, each adversely affecting
Adjudicasaurus Rex as a result of his inability to adapt. These
include high rates of growth, marked both by rising numbers of
disability claims and increasing numbers of Requests for Hearings
before an Administrative Law Judge; as well as greater numbers of
attorneys and non-attorney advocates.

51
52

Id.
Id.
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A. Rising Numbers of Claims
First, the evolving disability legal environment is characterized
by a high rate of growth over a relatively short period of time. This
has resulted in a national “backlog” which the system is unable to
resolve – no real mechanisms in place to resolve pending claims
absent the supposed “simple” and “informal” decisionmaking process
of the 1940’s – essentially holding hearings in the vast majority of all
pending claims. This is evident not only from statistical data (see,
Figure 2, supra), but in two key Supreme Court decisions. In 1971,
the United States Supreme Court in Richardson v. Perales53
described as “vast workings,” the administrative adjudicative and
appeals system statutorily a part of the Social Security Disability
program,54 with “over 20,000 disability claim[s\ hearings annually. .
.”55 A short twelve years later, in 1983, the Court in Heckler v.
Campbell observed that “[t]he Social Security hearing system is

53

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 at n. 6 (1971).
See 42 U.S.C. §405(a)(1), providing in-part:
The Commissioner of Social Security is directed to make
findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual
applying for a payment under this title . . . Upon request by any
such individual . . . who makes a showing in writing that his or
her rights may be prejudiced by any decision the Commissioner
of Social Security has rendered, the Commissioner shall give
such applicant and such other individual reasonable notice and
opportunity for a hearing with respect to such decision, and, if a
hearing is held, shall, on the basis of evidence adduced at the
hearing, affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s findings
of fact and such decision . . . The Commissioner of Social
Security is further authorized, on the Commissioner’s own
motion, to hold such hearings and to conduct such investigations
and other proceedings as the Commissioner may deem necessary
or proper for the administration of this title. In the course of any
hearing, investigation, or other proceeding, the Commissioner
may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and
receive evidence. Evidence may be received at any hearing
before the Commissioner of Social Security even though
inadmissible under rules of evidence applicable to court
procedure.
Id.
55
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 406.
54
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‘probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world.’"56
The Court went on to note “[a]pproximately 2.3 million claims for
disability benefits were filed in fiscal year 1981. . . More than a
quarter of a million of these claims required a hearing before an
administrative law judge.”57 This number now exceeds 800,000
annual hearings before administrative law judges.
Figure 2 depicts the growth in numbers of pending hearings from
just 2008 to the present. In 2014 the number of pending hearings
edged over the million case mark, described as the “backlog,”58
exceeding the admitted capacity of 400,00 hearings by more than two
times. Today, the number of pending disability appeals awaiting
hearing far exceeds the once-described “vast” totals of 1971,
swamping an adjudicatory system whose now antiquated
jurisprudence renders it unable to effectively address such volumes.

56

Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, n. 2 (1983) (citing, J. MASHAW, C.
GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL, & M. CARROW, SOCIAL
SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS XI (1978)).
57
Id., (citing SOCIAL SECURITY ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1981, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,32, 35, 38
(1982)).
58
Social Security Disability: Better Planning, Management, and Evaluation
Could Help Address Backlogs GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (December, 2007),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0840.pdf. The GAO notes that the Social Security
Administration defines a ‘backlog’ as those cases pending beyond an optimal
projected number at the end of a given fiscal year. The GAO describes the Social
Security Administration’s definition of a ‘backlogged’ case as follows:
SSA measures its claims processing performance at each
level of the process in terms of the number of claims pending
each year and the time it takes to issue a decision. Since 1999,
the agency has used a relative measure to determine the backlog
by considering how many cases should optimally be pending at
year-end. This relative measure is referred to as “target pending”
and is set for each level of the disability process with the
exception of the reconsideration level. SSA’s target pending is
400,000 for claims at the initial stage and 300,000 and 40,000 for
the hearings and Appeals Council stages, respectively. The
number of pending claims at year-end that exceed these numbers
represents the backlog.
Id.
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Figure 5

B. Rising Numbers of Attorneys and Non-Attorney Advocates
The second environmental element, now present in greater
numbers than ever before, is the rising presence of lawyers and nonlawyer advocates. In a system originally designed to be “informal”
in its jurisprudence, vesting the judge with the primary duty of
inquiry, today’s legal environment has overwhelmed the adjudicatory
system.
In the Anglo-American adversarial system of justice, the parties
are “active”—it is they, the parties—who present the evidence they
wish the decisionmaker to consider. The decisionmaker, judge and
jury, are neutral and “passive”—that is, neither the judge nor the jury
are sources of evidence. There is no independent duty of inquiry to
ensure the record is adequately developed. In the adversarial system,
a poor record will result in a loss. Not so under Social Security’s
quasi-inquisitorial system. A poorly developed record may give rise
to an appeal by the claimant, asserting the judge failed to do all that
he or she should have done to ensure the record is adequately
developed. In the adversarial system, it is the parties who must meet
their respective burdens of proof going forward. There is no
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evidentiary burden upon the judge. qHer role is to ensure due
process—ensuring a fundamentally fair, timely and just proceeding is
had. In the words of one writer, two essential values frame the
adversarial system;
An adversary system of adjudication, as generally defined, has
two essential elements. First, the parties themselves are responsible
for gathering and presenting evidence and arguments on behalf of
their positions. Second, the decisionmaker knows nothing of the
litigation until the trial, when the parties present their neatly
packaged cases to him. These elements are related to some of the
elements of fair adjudication identified above.59
Social Security’s version of an inquisitorial system requires the
judge “look fully into the issues,”60 donning “Three Hats”: one in
which she searches and gathers the evidence favorable to the
claimant; then dons the second hat and searches for the evidence
favorable to the government; finally deciding the case by returning to
the middle with the neutral hat supposedly firmly in place.61
Professor Sward echoes the “active” role of the inquisitorial judge as
directing the course of evidentiary production, effectively the reverse
of the adversarial system:
Inquisitorial adjudication is generally cast as the opposite of
adversarial adjudication.
Thus, two essential elements of
inquisitorial adjudication are: first, that the judge is primarily
responsible for supervising the gathering of evidence necessary to
resolve the issue; and, second, that the decisionmaker is not,
therefore, merely a receptor for information at a neatly packaged
trial, but is, instead, an active participant. In practice, an inquisitorial
"trial" such as is found in continental Europe may continue as a series
of hearings for several months as the judge considers what further
information he might need to resolve the dispute.62
This stands in stark contrast to traditional American jurisprudence
where it is the parties who are responsible for development of the
evidence. More significantly, because the Social Security hearings
outcome is judge-driven, requiring the judge be an “active”
59

Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 312 (1989).
60
20 C.F.R. Part 404 §944.
61
See, supra note 12.
62
Sward, supra note 54 at 313-14.
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participant in the development of the evidentiary record, she must, in
effect, convene every case. There is no mechanism, which affects
significant numbers of claims, to render decisions early, or, without a
full hearing, as there is no “other party” with whom claimant’s
counsel may confer. Thus, the “simple” and “informal” vision of the
1940 Social Security Board now continues, hobbling the system,
causing backlogs, because the inherent jurisprudence, once thought
ideal for an entitlements program in which few persons were
represented, now stands stymied by overwhelming numbers, with no
mechanism in place other than that which has been in place since the
earliest beginning.
Professor Verkuil notes that the vision for Social Security
specifically did not include a decisionmaking process akin to that in
the courts. Instead, it was envisioned that an “administrator” would
serve as an agent for the public, resolving questions of entitlement
consistent with the public goals of the program:
As guidelines for the legion of social security decisionmakers
who had to adjudicate eligibility and entitlement to the old-age and
survivors insurance program (and as time went on, the disability
program), the Social Security Board offered a new rationale for the
role of the decisionmaker in the hearing process. In a 1940
statement, the Board discussed the values to be achieved in an
administrative hearing in terms of “simplicity and informality” as
well as “accuracy and fairness.” It referred to a social security
decisionmaker as a “referee” or “social agent.”63 This concept of the
administrator as an agent for the public (working to ensure that the
program goals are fulfilled) is different from the roles assigned to the
common-law judge. The social security “referee” thus emerges with
a role that is independent of the judicial one . . . The decision model
proposed by the Social Security Board was designed to make an
enormously complex program work at low cost and with substantial
public satisfaction.64

63

In the original, the footnote is note 55, which reads:
See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD 1940 REPORT, MONOGRAPH OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, Pt.
3, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong. 1st, Sess. 37, 46 app. (1941).
64
Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78
COL. L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1978).
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This heritage continues within today’s Social Security
bureaucracy, which adopts terms such as “programmatic integrity” or
“policy compliant,” staunchly adhering to an outdated hybridinquisitorial system despite repeated and ongoing delay and rising
costs.
The seeming innocuous fact that the percentage of claimants now
represented by counsel is far greater than when Adjudicasaurus Rex
first roamed65 is not so innocuous in its effect. The “informal,” “nonadversarial” climate once allowed the seeming beneficent Hearing
Examiner, now, administrative law judge, to “wear Three Hats,” with
relative ease, adopting the role of public administrator—a role in
which it was envisioned that most persons would accept the result,
the government acting as “super parent:”
Here lies the essence of the current jurisprudence. It is an
agency-centric model adopting a 1930’s worldview powered by a
1950’s caretaker mentality in which the role of counsel is minimized
in favor of a strong agency decisionmaker, empowered to ensure the
‘right result’ is reached. It evokes an image of the government
reminiscent of the State in juvenile cases – the State as parens
patriae – or super-parent. More cogently, it accepts as a procedural
mandate the public policy underlying the Social Security Act,
expressed most plainly at 20 C.F.R. §404.508 (which deals with
waiver of an overpayment where “adjustment or recovery will defeat
the purpose of Title II”). That section provides, in-part, that to defeat
the purpose of “benefits under this title” means “to deprive a person
of income required for ordinary and necessary living expenses.”66
That is to say, the public policy underlying the Social Security Act is
to provide daily maintenance and sustenance for those unable to
65

See Robert G. Dixon, The Welfare State and Mass Justice: A Warning from
the Social Security Disability Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681, 693 (September
1972), who writes:
In 1964-65 [sic], attorneys represented claimants in
approximately 17-18% of the hearings. In the first six months of
1971, the number approached 21-23%. Figures were obtained
from Edward L. Binder, Technical Advisor, Bureau of Disability
Insurance, SSA-Baltimore Headquarters, August, 1971. The
right to retained counsel is available at prior decisional stages,
but cases in which it is exercise is rare.
Id.
66
20 C.F.R. §404.508(a).
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provide for themselves. The agency becomes the personified
intention of the government to provide for those who cannot provide
for themselves – in real terms, a ‘super parent.’” (Citations
omitted).67
Defining the Social Security decisionmaker (formerly the
Hearing Examiner and now the Administrative Law Judge) as one
who looks out for the welfare of the claimant by ensuring the record
is fully developed by the wearing of “Three Hats” is a direct
expression of this unique procedural mandate. In a jurisprudence
described as “non-adversarial” where the government chooses not to
appear; and instead imbues the decisionmaker with its and the
claimant’s responsibilities to present evidence, there can be little
doubt but that the intended role of the decisionmaker is not so much
that of a neutral as it is agency facilitator or “super parent”– a
uniquely different role from that of “judge” in the traditional AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence.68
The presence in great numbers of lawyers and non-lawyer
advocates changed all this.
The introduction of Velociraptor advocatasaurus or lawyers,
trained in the adversarial system of justice, upends the “Three Hat”
jurisprudence. With the advent of widespread representation,
Adjudicasaurus Rex no longer operates in the same legal
environment; yet, he has not adapted. The hearings process requires
that a claimant file a Request for Hearing by Administrative Law
Judge69 within 60 days of an adverse determination following
reconsideration.70 Hearings are closed to the public, on the record,71

67

Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Civil Justice Reform in Social Security Adjudications, 64
ADMIN. L. REV. 379, 384 (2012).
68
Id.
69
SOC. SEC. ADMINI. FORM HA-501-U5 (01-2015) ef (01-2015).
70
20 C.F.R. §404.933 (2014).
71
42 U.S.C. §405(g) provides for review by the federal courts of any decision
reached by the Commissioner of Social Security, and further provides that “[a]s
part of the Commissioner’s answer [in response to the claimant’s appeal to the
court] the Commissioner of Social Security shall file a certified copy of the
transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and
decision complained of are based.” Id. This has been interpreted to require an “onthe-record” proceeding for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. See,
e.g., for a further discussion on the applicability of the Administrative Procedure
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before an administrative law judge, akin to a “bench trial,”72 and are
described by current regulation as “nonadversarial.”73 Appeals from

Act to Social Security adjudications, Jeffrey S. Wolfe, Will You Make that
Commitment in Writing? The APA, ALJs and SSA, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 203 (2002).
72
A “bench trial” is a type of trial in which there is no jury. The judge must
determine both questions of law and questions of fact. See Definitions, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER
http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav=menu1&page=/fe
deral/courts.nsf/page/800; See e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996).
73
20 C.F.R. §404.900 describes generally the appeals process as well as the
jurisprudence of SSA’s decision-making process:
§ 404.900 Introduction.
(a) Explanation of the administrative review process. This subpart explains
the procedures we follow in determining your rights under title II of the Social
Security Act. The regulations describe the process of administrative review and
explain your right to judicial review after you have taken all the necessary
administrative steps. These procedures apply also to persons claiming certain
benefits under title XVIII of the Act (Medicare); see 42 CFR 405.701(c). The
administrative review process consists of several steps, which usually must be
requested within certain time periods and in the following order:
(1) Initial determination. This is a determination we make about your
entitlement or your continuing entitlement to benefits or about any other matter, as
discussed in §404.902, that gives you a right to further review.
(2) Reconsideration. If you are dissatisfied with an initial determination, you
may ask us to reconsider it.
(3) Hearing before an administrative law judge. If you are dissatisfied with
the reconsideration determination, you may request a hearing before an
administrative law judge.
(4) Appeals Council review. If you are dissatisfied with the decision of the
administrative law judge, you may request that the Appeals Council review the
decision.
(5) Federal court review. When you have completed the steps of the
administrative review process listed in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this
section, we will have made our final decision. If you are dissatisfied with our final
decision, you may request judicial review by filing an action in a Federal district
court.
(6) Expedited appeals process. At some time after your initial determination
has been reviewed, if you have no dispute with our findings of fact and our
application and interpretation of the controlling laws, but you believe that a part of
the law is unconstitutional, you may use the expedited appeals process. This
process permits you to go directly to a Federal district court so that the
constitutional issue may be resolved.
(b) Nature of the administrative review process. In making a determination or
decision in your case, we conduct the administrative review process in an informal,
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a judge’s decision may be made to the Appeals Council of the Social
Security Administration, and if affirmed, becomes the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security. At no point in this process
does the Social Security Administration make an appearance. Thus,
at no point, does claimant’s counsel have any opportunity to
negotiate an outcome short of hearing. In effect, the absence of the
Social Security Administration as a party from the hearings process
signals the inability of the agency to reach any result in a pending
claim short of hearing, mandating a hearing for each claim made,
exacerbating the hearings backlog. Complicating the process, the
Appeals Council may engage in “own motion review,” examining a
decision even if no appeal has been taken.74 A final decision of the
Commissioner is appealable to the United States courts for review
under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).75
Evidence of the 1940’s worldview remains apparent within the
regulatory scheme, largely in the form of weak procedural
mechanisms. Consider Title 20 C.F.R. Part 404 § 935, styled,
“SUBMITTING EVIDENCE PRIOR TO A HEARING BEFORE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE.” Section 935 purports to govern that
which stands at the heart of every disability adjudication: submission

nonadversary manner. In each step of the review process, you may present any
information you feel is helpful to your case. Subject to the limitations on Appeals
Council consideration of additional evidence (see §§404.970(b) and 404.976(b)),
we will consider at each step of the review process any information you present as
well as all the information in our records. You may present the information
yourself or have someone represent you, including an attorney. If you are
dissatisfied with our decision in the review process, but do not take the next step
within the stated time period, you will lose your right to further administrative
review and your right to judicial review, unless you can show us that there was
good cause for your failure to make a timely request for review. [45 FR 52081,
Aug. 5, 1980, as amended at 51 FR 300, Jan 3, 1986; 51 FR 8808, Mar. 14, 1986;
52 FR 4004, Feb. 9, 1987].
74
See 20 C.F.R. Part 404 §969(a), which provides:
General. Anytime within 60 days after the date of a decision
or dismissal that is subject to review under this section, the
Appeals Council may decide on its own motion to review the
action that was taken in your case. We may refer your case to the
Appeals Council for it to consider reviewing under this authority.
Id.
75
See, supra note 4.
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of the objective medical and other evidence. The regulation rather
weakly provides:
If possible, the evidence or a summary of evidence you wish to
have considered at the hearing should be submitted to the
administrative law judge with the request for hearing or within 10
days after filing the request. Each party shall make every effort to be
sure that all material evidence is received by the administrative law
judge or is available at the time and place set for the hearing.76
Section 935 provides no certitude, sets no deadlines, gives no
authority to the judge to set any timeframe within which to produce
the requisite evidence, and essentially leaves, without any means of
enforcement, the submission of evidence entirely to counsel; whose
fee increases the greater the gap between the alleged onset date and
the date of decision. This deficit is compounded by Section 944,
which requires the judge look “fully into the issues,” interpreted as
creating an affirmative duty of inquiry,77 even though no mechanisms
exist to require counsel to, in fact, produce such evidence. Indeed,
review of the regulatory scheme reveals few deadlines; and while the
judge presides over the course of the hearing, she has few, if any
procedural mechanisms, which allow her to expedite the hearing
process.78 Even setting the hearing date does not guarantee an
expeditious result, as there is no regulatory mechanism to close the
record after hearing.
76
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The Social Security Administration has long known of these
issues and despite the mounting body of evidence, has been
manifestly ineffective in addressing, much less resolving the growing
number of disability appeals that now form what is termed “the
backlog.”
Adjudicasaurus Rex seems destined to follow the paths of his
reptilian cousins.

VI. WHAT IF, REVISITED
As optimistic as bureaucratic predictions of success often are,
they have not, in this instance, been accurate regarding the growing
backlog.
Reports from the GAO, the Government’s agency
watchdog, tell the tale:
• In 1999, the GAO observed that “SSA’s disability claims
process, which has not changed fundamentally in over 40 years, is
inherently complex and fragmented.”79
• Some four years later, the GAO found that despite widespread
understanding of coming insolvency, little had been done, saying,
“Our January 2001 report . . . identified the long-term solvency and
sustainability of the social security system as one of the most urgent
policy challenges facing the nation and SSA . . . However, as the time
approaches when Social Security’s expenditures will exceed its
income, there is still no consensus on a plan for reforming the social
security system.”80
• In 2005 the status quo remained as the GAO again recounted
the impending crisis marked by expenditures in disability payments
which had at that point quadrupled between 1982 and 2002. The
GAO again observed that while “the number of disabled workers
79
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receiving benefits under SSA’s Disability Insurance (DI) program
doubled from 2.6 million to 5.5 million . . . payments quadrupled
from about $14.8 billion to $60 billion. Moreover, these disability
programs are poised to grow even more as baby boomers reach their
disability-prone years.”81 (Emphasis added).
• In 2005 the GAO in 2005 also stated that “[o]ver the past
several years, GAO, in reporting that the largest federal disability
programs were mired in outdated concepts of disability, has
identified the need to reexamine and transform these programs to
better position the government to meet the challenges and
expectations of the 21st century.” (Emphasis added).82
• By fiscal year 2006, cases on appeal to Social Security
administrative law judges “rose dramatically [from 12,000 cases in
1999] to over 415,000 claims by the close of fiscal year 2006 and
constituted about 72 percent of all SSA backlogged claims that
year.”83
• “Since September 2009, SSA has reported progress toward
eliminating its hearings-level backlog—defined as reducing the
number of pending cases to SSA’s target of 466,000.”84
• “In March 2010, SSA reported that pending cases were down to
697,437 from 760,000 in fiscal year 2008.”85
While SSA claims to be successful in reducing backlogged cases,
the raw numbers tell a different story – one of a rising backlog, with
a progression in 2006 of 415,000 pending appeals to 466,000 in 2009
and 697,000 in 2010. In 2007, the GAO pointedly observes that
“management weakness as evidenced by a number of initiatives that
were not successfully implemented have limited SSA’s ability to
81
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remedy the backlog.”86 The GAO report continues, noting that
“[s]everal initiatives introduced by SSA in the last 10 years to
improve processing times and eliminate backlogged claims have,
because of their complexity and poor execution, actually added to the
problem. For example, the “Hearings Process Improvement”
initiative implemented in fiscal year 2000 significantly increased the
days it took to adjudicate a hearings claim and exacerbated the
backlog after the agency had substantially reduced it.”87
The problems are not new. As early as 1970 concern was being
voiced that the system was in trouble. “The total volume of work has
been onerous and has tended to increase each year. For fiscal year
1970 . . . almost 800,000 worker disability claims were filed in
district offices . . . across the nation; 1971 claims exceeded this
number by almost 150,000.” 88 The writer accurately warns against a
rising caseload:
Although the number of disability claims subject to
administrative adjudication and court litigation has been high, the
current volume may prove to be only the warning tip of the iceberg.
If, in addition to the black lung legislation, Congress enacts the
extensive welfare reforms embodied in H.R. 1, the Social Security
Amendments of 1972, the combined effect of these two plans, plus
the natural growth rate in the original disability program, will yield
further substantial increases in the number of disability claims filed
with the SAA.89
Dixon levels criticism of the adjudicatory process, predicting
accurately its future course:
Thus, in the interest of fairness and equality, hearings and appeals
are instituted, and the welfare recipient, in his economic life, almost
unavoidably tends to become a “federal case.” A level of fairness,
equality of treatment, and “correctness” of decision which would be
unmanageable in the private sphere is sought – indeed, is
constitutionally mandated because “state action” is involved. The
long range question is at what point of volume and complexity a high
level of decisional formality and review of each resource allocation
86
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determination becomes unworkable in the welfare system because
decisions on claims cannot be produced with sufficient speed,
fairness and consistency.
Against this backdrop, and facing the insolvency of the Disability
Insurance Program in 2016, the Acting Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration, appeared before the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform on June 11, 2014.90 As
recounted in-part, above, no specific ideas were voiced apart from
increasing FICA withholding or linking the DIB Trust Fund with the
Retirement Fund; neither idea well received.
Assume a different dialogue than that originally had with the
Committee Chair, Mr. Darrell Issa (D-California), then U.S.
Representative Mr. James Lankford (R-Oklahoma)91 and Mr. Jim
Jordan (D-Ohio). What if there was a dialogue with a hypothetical
Commissioner of Social Security, this time about saving
Adjudicasaurus Rex?

VII. REWINDING THE CLOCK
Unleash H.G. Wells and consider the words of Rod Serling,
“You're traveling through another dimension, a dimension not only of
sight and sound but of mind; a journey into a wondrous land whose
boundaries are that of imagination. Your next stop...the Twilight
Zone.”92
What could have been discussed between Chairman Issa and the
Commissioner? Consider a hypothetical conversation between
Chairman Issa, the members of the House Committee on Government
Oversight and Reform, and a hypothetical Commissioner of Social
Security.

90
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Framing the Issues
Chairman Issa:
Do you believe that Congress needs to give greater authority, not
greater money, greater authority, to fire, to reform, to review if you
are in fact going to represent the American People’s best interest of
their tax dollars?93
The Commissioner:94
We agree that the best interests of the American people lie in
reforming the current system of disability assessment and appeal. By
this, I mean we must re-examine what it means to be “disabled” in
the year 2016. This examination embraces a substantive review of
the criteria by which one is adjudicated “disabled.” It also means
that we must bring our current system of disability appeals into the
21st Century. It is no longer 1956. Unlike the circumstances extant
in those bygone years, more than 80% of all claimants are now
represented by either attorneys or certified non-lawyer
representatives. Television advertisements crisscross the airways as
national disability firms have sprung into being, seeking to take
advantage of a growing disability economic infrastructure embracing
some $200 billion annually.95 This represents more than 5 million
Title II disability insurance (DI), and Title XVI supplemental security
income (SSI) claimants annually filing for such benefits in 2013
alone.96
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Chairman Issa:97
There is still the issue, represented by the actions of some 185
administrative law judges, who decide appeals, reversing underlying
administrative denials at rates of 85% or greater. Clearly, these
judges who represent a little over 10% of sitting administrative law
judges in Social Security’s Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review, do not represent the majority, and yet should we not take
steps to ensure against such outliers?98 Should we not impose some
sort of control over decision-making gone awry and thereby seek to
protect the American people from actions, which imperil the
Disability Insurance fund?
The Commissioner:
Mr. Chairman, you raise several issues which have no simple
answer. Let me address each in turn. First, the agency has been
accused of encouraging decisionmaking by administrative law
judges, which serve to “pay down the backlog.”99 The most
egregious example of this is the 2011 West Virginia action. My
review of the circumstances surrounding the 2011 West Virginia
incident leads me to conclude that there are instances wherein the
agency should have taken action more expeditiously to curb judicial
activity which contravened established agency policy, particularly as

Workload, Fiscal Year 2013 (in millions)
Type of filing
Number
OASI claims
5.0
DI claims
3.2
SSI applications
2.6
97
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regards assignment of cases. Not to say that I mean we should have
curbed judicial decision-making under the Administrative Procedure
Act, nor that we should or could have encouraged any particular
result in a judicial hearing, but rather that an investigation should
have been initiated far earlier than was the case. In this, our critics
are correct, for the net effect of agency inaction in 2011 was to
encourage decision-making behavior violative of agency policy
which otherwise assures a claimant due process of law.
Chairman Issa:
Without imposing any limit on your response to my earlier
question, how would such reform be implemented?
The Commissioner:
Thank you Mr. Chairman. We need to change our institutional
culture. The success of SSA’s mission depends upon our employees.
There is a time-tested adage in the lessons of naval leadership which
deserves our attention and, I think, our immediate implementation:
“Loyalty down begets loyalty up.” 100 We have been guilty of
tunnel-vision – focused on achieving a results-oriented outcome,
bound to an outdated adjudicatory process, failing to look first to
infrastructure reform. In so doing, I fear we have demanded ‘loyalty
up’ without the reciprocal expression of ‘loyalty down.’ By this I
mean, we failed, in a most fundamental way, to respect the
professionalism, dedication and insight of our employees – and, yes,
our judges.
Speaking to the West Virginia incident, my review leads me to
conclude that local and regional leadership became focused, almost
to the exclusion of all else, upon resolving the local “backlog.”101
That meant we looked the other way, endorsing heightened
decisionmaking no matter the cost – in that case, disproportionately
large numbers of decisions by a single judge. In maintaining a
numbers-driven focus, we did not hear, nor did we respect, the
persistent and long-standing warnings of our employees.102 In failing
100
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to do so, the local and regional chief judges fundamentally forfeited
their respective leadership roles. By ignoring the warnings of our
own employees we erroneously, if all-but-unintentionally, embraced
the old proverb, ‘silence is golden.’
West Virginia painfully reminds us that management is not
leadership, and that good managers must first and foremost be good
leaders. In the end, Mr. Chairman, and in answer to your question,
implementation of needed reform is not simply a matter of continuing
education or leadership training videos, but instead, begins with
voicing and adoption of a new corporate message. The focus of our
collective activity should, in the first and last instance, always be
service, not production quotas, numbers or goals. We should be first
concerned with the quality of our service to the American people and
not find our motivation in the wringing of hands over the continuing
backlog. If we serve the American people effectively, I am confident
we will eliminate the hearings backlog.
To be successful, however, I emphasize again, we must be
effective, and effective service starts by changing our corporate
culture, respecting the voices of our employees – and most certainly
of our judges. In doing so, we must work toward creation of an
environment in which leadership, and not management, is the
lifeblood of our activity.
Chairman Issa, deferring to Mr. Lankford of Oklahoma:103
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I am nonetheless concerned,
Commissioner, that some 10% of Social Security administrative law
judges are reversing between 85% and 100% of their assigned
disability appeals, creating, in a less dramatic fashion, essentially the
same result found in West Virginia.104 Judges who compromise their

103
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integrity, who fail to properly implement their sworn duty, and who,
in so doing, imperil the well-being of the citizenry do not deserve to
remain in their respective positions. Surely, Commissioner, there
must be a solution to this problem? And, surely, you do not condone
a reversal rate in which 85% to 100% of appeals are granted,
resulting in a payment of disability benefits when the average
reversal rate for the majority of administrative law judges is between
40% and 60%? Just as certainly, would you not advocate for a
change, either in the authority of the agency to discipline or regulate
judicial decisionmaking; or, even in the elimination of such judges
altogether?
I yield the floor back to Chairman Issa.

VIII. A NEW JURISPRUDENCE
The Commissioner:
Thank you Congressman Lankford. I appreciate your question,
not because it may be interpreted by some as implicit permission for
action to be taken against these judges, and in some way freeing my
hands politically to do so; but because it highlights critical
shortcomings in the current system of disability appeals. Do we need
federal administrative law judges? The answer is unequivocally, yes.
I do not wish that we replace these judges with other decisionmakers
of lesser standing, for it is important that the American people know,
understand, and be assured that their interests in this critical arena are
in the hands of capable professionals. Our government has entrusted
these serious decisions to federal administrative law judges -individuals who have been carefully screened, literally chosen from
100 awarded benefits to 90% or more of applicants, according to
agency statistics.
Id.
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among thousands of applicants, and whose credentials rival those of
their counterparts in the federal judiciary.105 We, as Americans need
to be able to place our trust, faith and reliance in the professionalism
of those who serve in this critical role.
That being said, the current system by which such judges are now
employed, is flawed. We should not look to the decisionmaking of
these few judges, and in so doing, make an argument that the position
of administrative law judges must change. Neither should we
conclude that there is somehow a need for greater authority over such
judges. Rather, the evidence you cite is indicative of a system whose
hallmarks, design and structure has been overtaken by the passage of
time, a result of a fundamental changes in the legal landscape. It is
not that administrative law judges are flawed or that they have
ignored their duty, but rather, I am satisfied from my review, that it is
the legal landscape of disability appeals that has changed around
them. The upshot has been an ever-increasing potential for legal
conundrums, with the sometime contrary result illustrated by the
statistics you’ve cited.
Just as the central character (“the Time Traveler”) in H.G. Wells’
famous story, The Time Machine, found himself stymied by the
application of 19th Century conventions in the far future world of the
Eloi and the Morlocks, so, I suggest, are administrative law judges
now faced with a much different world than was contemplated when
the current judicial/adjudicatory infrastructure was designed. Time
has passed the current system of disability appeals by. The result is
that we now seem to be trying to force a round peg into a square hole.
The consequent delay in attempting to force-fit the round peg has
resulted in an ever-growing backlog of disability appeals. Our
current system embraces a 1950’s culture whose tenants were formed
in the legal culture of that era.
Congressman Issa:
I have asked you to speak plainly here, and I have not hesitated to
do so myself because of the critical nature of the issues before us; so,
let me ask you this: How is it you say the legal landscape has
changed with a resultant failure of the disability appeals system to
properly function, when, the judicial system, represented by the Third
105
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Branch of our government remains largely unchanged and seemingly
unaffected by the passage of time through the course of our nation’s
history? What has happened and understanding that, how can the
present system be fixed?
The Commissioner:
Mr. Chairman, I’m not a legal scholar, but I have asked myself
that same question. Here’s what I have learned. Our nation’s current
system of adversarial jurisprudence is part of our rich heritage – a
legacy from our historical foundation as a British colony. The
American judicial system is grounded upon, and adheres to, the
fundamental tenants of due process of law, providing fair and
impartial resolution of disputes. Our system of laws has been hailed
as the finest in the world, enabling each party to their ‘day in court,’
governed by the Constitution, statute, and regulation as well as by
formal rules of evidence and procedure. It contemplates an
adversarial jurisprudence.
In this, there are unique differences between the American
judicial system and the Social Security administrative appeals
process. Among the differences, the Social Security administrative
appeals system is non-adversarial – a critical distinction, setting it
apart from the traditions of the Anglo-American system.
Chairman Issa:
Madam Commissioner, you make a fine distinction, but the
question now is, should this distinction, this critical difference, be set
aside? Faced with rising costs and delay, the federal courts in 1990
participated in a grand experiment under the Civil Justice Reform
Act,106 bringing to the table a variety of dispute resolution practices,
ranging from arbitration to summary jury trials to mediation. The
experiment brought about the ADR Act of 1998,107 mandating each
federal district court have an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism in place, effectively converting the federal court to a
multi-door courthouse – where disputes can be resolved traditionally,
or through alternative means. In addition, greater control over the
life of a case was given the judge, removing from the parties the

106
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control which so often led to delay as one side sought to gain
advantage over the other, even in the procedural aspects of the case.
As a result of these actions, the federal courts have largely
resolved the issues of cost and delay. Isn’t it time that the
‘distinction’ in the Social Security appeals process be brought into
conformity with the American system of justice – a system which has
shown itself to be flexible, able to meet the demands of a growing
and ever more diverse society?
The Commissioner:
Mr. Chairman, the American legal system stands as one of the
most significant accomplishments in human history. Bringing its
principles to the Social Security appeals process – the largest
administrative adjudicatory system in the world – is a laudable goal.
It is important, however, when undertaking such a task that we
understand the genesis of the disability appeals process as we know it
today.
Interestingly, when first passed, the Social Security Act did not
contemplate the presence of claimant’s counsel. In fact, when
enacted in 1935, the Social Security Act made no provision for
representation of claimants. In 1939, four years after the passage of
the original Social Security Act, Section 206 was added. The
legislative history behind that section explained that “. . . it is not
contemplated that the services of an agent or attorney will be
necessary in presenting the vast majority of claims . . .”,108 but a
provision was nevertheless finally made to provide for representation
and regulate attorney fees. As you can see, even in 1939, it was not
thought likely that claimants would require representation. This is
because it was thought that the Social Security Administration was
brought into being to assist the American people – not stand as an
adversary. Indeed, even more than a quarter century after the
passage of the Social Security Act, representation of claimants was
low. For example, statistics show that “[b]etween January 1966 and
July 1967 claimants were represented by attorneys in about 19% of
the cases decided by [then] Hearing Examiners.”109
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But, all this changed over time. In fiscal year 2006 a September
2007 report by SSA’s OIG shows that of the 559,000 claims heard by
Administrative Law Judges, 439,000 were represented by attorney
and non-attorney representatives, representing claimants in almost
80% of all claims appealed. Examined another way, the OIG notes,
‘[i]n FY 2006, approximately 26,000 attorneys and 5,000 nonattorneys represented claimants before ODAR.’ In a period of 40
years the statistics have virtually become mirror-images of one
another. Where 80% of all persons were unrepresented in 1968, by
2006 80% or all persons are represented.’110
Chairman Issa:
And, the significance of these numbers?
The Commissioner:
Put simply, Mr. Chairman, ‘This is not your father’s Oldsmobile.’
The 1988 General Motors ad sought to reinvent a brand whose time
had come and, in 2004, went. It’s not a matter of tweaking the
operation. We’ve tried that. It’s now a question of fundamental
reform.
You asked what we need.
To answer your question, I need authority for reform. Not
authority to discipline or control judges; but authority to reform the
adjudicatory system in which our judges work. The statistics
regarding claimant representation signals a fundamental sea-change
in the legal landscape – a change we have failed to timely recognize,
and as a result continue to suffer a growing backlog of pending
appeals.
Chairman Issa:
I yield the floor to my colleague from Ohio, Congressman Jordan.
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Mr. Jordan:111
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Madam Commissioner, it strikes me
that what you’re saying actually touches upon more than, as you say,
‘the legal landscape.’ Am I correct in that? And if so, would you
provide an overview of each proposed reform?
The Commissioner:
In answer to both questions, yes, Congressman. And, when I
speak of reform, I am referring to both procedural as well as
substantive reforms in the disability appeals paradigm.
To make the disability appeals system begin to work as we have
all hoped it would, requires a fundamentally fresh viewpoint. We
must set aside the assumptions, pressures, perceptions, and turmoil
surrounding the current system of disability appeals and start anew,
saving what we can, but changing what we must.
To address the question of procedural reform, we must first look
at the foundations of the current system. Why do we have the system
now in place? How did it come into being?
The present system of disability appeals was devised during a
time when there were comparatively few claims and when even
fewer claimants were represented. The role of the then Hearing
Examiner, now, Administrative Law Judge, was, as it is today, to
preside over a nonadversarial proceeding, directed to the question of
entitlement. A claimant who was unrepresented was able to rely on
the assistance of the judge in developing his or her claim. Under this
model, the judge, acting like his or her European inquisitorial
counterpart, searches first for all the evidence favorable to the
claimant, and then for the evidence which favors the Government.
The judge then determines, looking to the whole of the evidence,
whether the claimant is entitled to an award of benefits. Examined
another way, the Social Security Administration, whether by design
or happenstance, devised a unique jurisprudence, founded on both the
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Anglo-American and European inquisitorial systems – in effect, a
hybrid jurisprudence not otherwise employed in the United States.112
With the passage of time, the problem is self-evident. This
hybrid jurisprudence, designed for a time when few persons were
represented by counsel, is no longer effective in a milieu in which
representation of claimants is now the norm, complete with late-night
television advertisements. In a legal system now populated by
lawyers, the hybrid jurisprudence hinders the disability appeals
process, creating self-sustaining backlogs, a fact now evident over
decades.
Mr. Jordan:
Does the current system employ rules of procedure or rules of
evidence?
The Commissioner:
Formal rules? It does not Congressman. Our judges have raised
this issue, but in our view, implementation of formal rules in the
current system would be ineffective. A body of regulations exist
which govern the hearings process, but key issues remain unresolved,
such as the need to close the hearings record at the conclusion of a
hearing – something that can and should be done with the enactment
of formal rules.
Mr. Jordan:
You acknowledge the need for such rules then?
The Commissioner
Not under the current system, Congressman. As I indicated, what
we ask for are the resources for system-wide reform.
Mr. Jordan Yields to Chairman Issa:
I’d prefer, Madam Commissioner, if you can give us an overview
of these ‘reforms.’
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The Commissioner:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I can. I have prepared some general remarks,
outlining the areas of needed reforms.
I think we sometimes lose sight of our priorities; that we first
serve the public. And, the public is watching. There has been a
longstanding, shall we call it, ‘debate,’ between the Social Security
Administration and its corps of Administrative Law Judges. It is a
debate which has found its way into the federal courts, before
arbitrators, and before those in the media; and as you can see, among
those whom we serve. Those of us in ‘management’ sometimes see
things differently from those in the corps of administrative law
judges – in part, because of our difference in worldview; and in part,
because there is a unique tension between independence in
decisionmaking and consistency in decisionmaking. But, that being
said, it is time to bridge the gap. I am mindful of the words of the
Social Security Advisory Board:
The agency has much to gain from the advice and input of the
dedicated professionals in the ALJ corps, at the national, regional,
and hearing office levels. The ALJ corps, in turn, needs to
acknowledge the agency’s legitimate desire to ensure that hearing
decisions are made promptly and consistently. There is an
understandable and probably inevitable tension between the public’s
interest in decisional independence and the public’s interest in
consistency and efficiency, but we believe these interests can be
reconciled. We urge SSA and its ALJs to work together to develop
reasonable procedures to reconcile them.113
In that spirit, I come before you today to ask for support for
needed reforms, which, with your permission, I will outline in the
balance of my testimony today.

113

The Real Issue . . . And Why Further Restriction of Judicial Independence
in Social Security is a Bad Idea, ASS’N OF ADMIN. LAW JUDGES, 1-2 (2014),
https://aalj.org/system/files/documents/the_real_issue_12-19_docx_revision_1-1114_docx_fourth__finalcut-accepted-_wfc.pdf (quoting. Improving The Social
Security Administration's Hearing Process, SOC. SEC.ADVISORY BD ,15 (2006),
http://www.ssab.gov/Portals/0/OUR_WORK/REPORTS/HearingProcess_2006.pdf
).
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As the President’s ‘Blue Ribbon Commission’114 on Social
Security, the Social Security Advisory Board should not be lightly
regarded. I fear, though, that too often my predecessors have ignored
this call for unity. I stand here before you today to tell you that I
know we cannot ask for your help unless we acknowledge the value
of our respective views and agree to work more closely with one
another. Only then can meaningful reform take place.
Chairman Issa:
A lofty sentiment Commissioner, but not one that the agency’s
track record gives us any hope for real change.
The Commissioner:
How shall I say this? Trust me Mr. Chairman, I’m from the
Government and I’m here to help.
[laughter]
Chairman Issa:
You may proceed Commissioner.

The Commissioner:
A fundamental needed reform lies in the jurisprudence of our
hearing procedures. A change of such magnitude appears costly, but
with offsetting costs, we think such a change may not, in fact, be as
costly as we once thought. Here’s what we propose.
The former jurisprudence must end, replaced by a neutral,
collaborative jurisprudence in which the Social Security
Administration is a party – an active participant. Reforms include:
• Empowering claimants. Establish within the Office of General
Counsel, a “Disability Representative” or D.R.,” within Social
Security’s OGC, and who, in turn, supervises ADR’s or Assistant
Disability Representatives, either attorneys or certified non-lawyer
representatives, assigned to work within each Hearing Office. The
presence of the “DR” empowers claimants by providing systemic
flexibility. Rather than wait stolidity ‘in line,’ for “your turn” at a
hearing, each case proceeding one after the other as if all were cut

114

Id. at 2.
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from the same cloth, the DR opens the possibility of a resolution
tailored to the particular facts of the individual appeal, advancing the
case to conclusion at the earliest opportunity. At present there exists
a mounting backlog of pending hearings because there is no viable
mechanism by which appeals can be individually addressed and
resolved early. The overwhelming majority of pending appeals are
resolved in order of their filing. Cases which could be resolved early
in the appeals life-cycle cannot be systematically addressed at an
earlier time. No mechanism exists by which such cases can be so
advanced. Instead, 85 – 90% of all cases are heard in order of their
filing. In today’s system, this same percentage is resolved, only by a
full hearing. The result is a growing backlog, inherent in a system
which lacks the flexibility to resolve those cases which can resolved
early. The “DR” provides an avenue of communication, injecting
into the present system a new “party” – the Agency itself, which has
not, heretofore, been present as a “party.”
• The Disability Representative is thus charged to advocate for
the correct result in any given claim pending before an administrative
law judge. Ready access to the “ADR” will enable early resolution
of pending claims and balanced development of the administrative
record.
The establishment of the Office of the Disability
Representative acknowledges the Agency as a “party” to the
disability hearing, and in so doing returns the judge to her status as a
neutral, passive decisionmaker, thus ending the so-called “Three Hat
Jurisprudence.” To this point the Agency is not, in fact, a “party” to
the proceedings before administrative law judges. Thus, should the
Agency disagree with a judge’s decision to award benefits there is no
one present at the hearing who can file an appeal; as the only party
generally present is the claimant (who can, as a party, lodge an
appeal with the Appeals Council.)
• The DR empowers claimants because he/she becomes an early
point of contact, accessible to the claimant’s representative,
independent of any contact with the judge, early in the life of an
appeal. This allows, among other outcomes, early agreed-upon case
disposition as permitted by the evidence. Doing so, ends the current
system of rigidly scheduled hearings, each case standing in lock-step
one behind the other in a frozen line, with little alternative but to hear
every case despite its merits, and as history has shown, inevitably
expanding the ongoing backlog. The DR remedies this circumstance
by offering early alternatives for case resolution, either by enabling
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early additional fact finding or discovery; amending the onset date; or
limiting the issues to be resolved at a hearing.
• The presence of the Agency as a “party” to the proceedings,
through the DR also serves to increase disposition rates, with an
attendant reduction in the number of cases requiring a full hearing,
enabling fast-track hearings where only limited issues are presented
for hearing.
• The presence of the Agency by and through the DR also enables
the implementation of multiple hearing tracks, empowering the
claimant and the DR to determine the degree of case management
necessary, and whether cases may be ‘fast-tracked,’ fostering early
case management with counsel where the claimant is represented.
• The presence of the Agency as a party enhances the judicial role
and function, enabling an early case-management function with
active judicial involvement through the life of the hearings process,
all as part of the adoption of a comprehensive rules of procedure.
This enables active discussion early in the life of a claim between the
judge and the parties, setting deadlines and scheduling suitable to the
nature of the claim.
• The presence of the Social Security Administration as a “party”
enables burden of discovery and case development to be shifted from
the judge (who is now said to act in an inquisitorial role, with a duty
to develop the record, much like a party) to the Agency in the person
of the DR; returning the judge to her traditional role as an impartial
neutral. It is the Agency, then, and not the judge, who bears the
burden of ensuring the record is complete. Disagreements between
the Agency and the claimant about needed development (such as
ordering the claimant to undergo a consultative examination) may
then be neutrally decided by the judge, who no longer has a burden of
development, akin to that of a party.
• Appellate review is limited to those cases/decisions which raise
issues of significant public policy and/or which involve significant
issues of statutory/regulatory interpretation affecting the disability
program.115
• Both the Agency (acting by and through the DR) and the
claimant are thus limited in their right of appeal, such that questions
of fact which do not raise issues of significant public policy or
115

Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 37 at 580-83.
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statutory/regulatory interpretation affecting the disability program are
not subject of appeal.
• Similarly, appellate review by the Appeals Council is limited to
those cases, which present issues of significant public policy or
statutory/regulatory interpretation in matters affecting disability
adjudication.
• Today, Appeals Council decisions are not precedential.116 The
limitation of appeals to the Appeals Council, should be accompanied
by a change in the nature of appellate review, such that Appeals
Council decisions establish precedent, thereby ensuring consistency
of decision making; adopting principles of appellate review much as
an appeals court in the traditional court system. This includes
granting deference to the facts found by ‘trial court’ (the
administrative law judge), such that appeal is based solely on
questions of law, regulation and policy and not a re-weighing of the
facts. Such a review will, of necessity, recognize the “harmless
error” rule, deferring to the administrative law judge’s findings by a
preponderance of the evidence.
• Part and parcel of such reform necessarily includes adoption of
a comprehensive set of rules, necessary to govern the hearings
process, establishing deadlines, closing the record and provide
thereby ascertainable and enforceable benchmarks by which the case
advances to conclusion. At present, no such affirmative rules exist.
• Reform monetary expenditures, ending travel reimbursement
for counsel and reversing the current “pay-for-delay” contingent
attorney’s fee, and establishing a revised contingent fee linked to
early case resolution.
The current contingent attorney’s fee
incentivizes delay. The current attorney’s fee award is 25% of past
due benefits or $6,000 whichever is less, so the longer the case
decision is delayed, the greater the attorney’s fee.117 Reversing this,
so that an attorney is paid more the earlier a case is decided
incentivizes early case resolution and will fuel a new ‘reformed’
adjudicatory framework in which the attorney’s motivation is aligned
with that of her client.118

116

Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 578 n.240.
118
See Id. at 579-80, in which the authors suggest the following alternative to
the current “pay-for-delay” attorney’s fee:
117
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Chairman Issa
Commissioner, I would be most interested in exploring each of
these potential reforms. My question generally is whether in your
opinion implementation of these reforms will, in fact, be effective in
1) reducing the backlog; and 2) decreasing individual case
disposition time? Will these reforms take us further from the demise
of the disability program?
The Commissioner
In a word, Chairman Issa, “yes.”

One example is a flat fee. Upon an award, an attorney or
representative would be entitled to an established fee, regardless
of the amount of past-due benefits or the amount of time spent
preparing the case. The amount of the fee would be governed by
the complexity of the case, much as is the case now with a fee
petition.
Adopting the current maximum fee of $ 6,000, the ALJ would
determine whether counsel would receive one-third of the
maximum [($ 2,000)], two-thirds of the maximum [($ 4,000)], or
the maximum fee [($ 6,000)], dependent upon the complexity of
the case. . . .Alternatively, attorney fees could be time-dependent.
Resolution of the claim within six months of filing the Request
for Hearing would result in payment of the maximum fee of $
6,000. Hearing within twelve months would result in payment of
$ 4,000, whereas any resolution after twelve months would result
in a fee of $ 2,000. The same rules for payment would apply as
outlined above. Time-dependent resolution encourages counsel to
proceed with the case, which would benefit the claimant, who
otherwise stands in need of a timely decision. It is even possible
for the two scenarios to be combined, such that the primary
determining factor is time, and upon motion of counsel the ALJ
may increase an otherwise lower fee based upon complexity of
the case [or similar factors per the HALLEX]. . . . Realignment
of the fee structure accomplishes a positive realignment of both
the claimant's and the representative's interests.
Id.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Whether Adjudicasaurus Rex survives is a question of will. But
how is this to be expressed? Let us assume, in the previous
hypothetical dialogue, that Chairman Issa calls yet a further witness,
a systems engineering expert, called upon to examine the efficacy of
the current system of hearings and appeals and to describe,
symbolically, the problem now facing the Social Security
adjudicatory process/paradigm.
Chairman Issa
I want to explore one additional question. How do we assess the
efficacy of the reforms which you have outlined? To answer this
question, the process we follow should be clear. I have asked
Professor Smith,119 a renowned expert in systems engineering, to
speak with us. Professor, would you be so kind as to share with the
Committee and the American people, why a systems engineering
viewpoint is necessary?
Professor Smith
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. First,
let me give you a brief overview of systems engineering.
“Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary field of engineering that
focuses on how to design and manage complex engineering systems
over their life cycles . . . Systems engineering deals with workprocesses, optimization methods, and risk management tools in such
projects. It overlaps technical and human-centered disciplines such
as control
engineering, industrial
engineering, software
engineering, organizational studies, and project management.

119

The dialogue set forth in this and in succeeding paragraphs is solely a
fictional creation of the authors and not anyone living or dead other than our
hypothetical “Professor Smith.”
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Systems engineering ensures that all likely aspects of a project or
system are considered, and integrated into a whole.”120
The disability hearings and appeals process is a system,
susceptible to an engineering analysis, while remaining mindful of
the overarching human ideals upon which it stands – to provide due
process, that is, a full, fair and impartial hearing. In such an analysis,
we must be mindful that the system does not overwhelm the ideal.
Analysis of the current Social Security disability appeals
paradigm necessarily involves a significant number of systemic
variables, focused primarily upon organizational structures and
principals of project management. I will not, however, go there
today. Instead, I wish to make evident a simple conclusion and in
doing so, demonstrate a clear need for a new course – in effect
demonstrating an inevitable need for change.
Assume the following, and I apologize for the seeming
complexity of the “math,” but here goes. If I many direct your
attention to the Smart Board to my left . . .
Using present hearing protocols as followed by ODAR in the
hearings and appeals process, I’m going to focus on a set of simple
variables to illustrate my point, as follows:
“R” represents the number of hearings pending resolved by all
means.
“H” represents the number of hearings pending decided by
hearing.
“S” represents the number of hearings pending decided by Senior
Attorney Adjudicators without a hearing.
“D” represents the number of hearings dismissed121 before
hearing.
Assume the following is then true:
R = H + S + D; where the number of pending hearings resolved
(“R”) is the sum of those decided by means of a full, formal hearing
(“H”); those decided by Senior Attorney Adjudicators (“S”); and
those dismissed (“D”) before hearing.

120

Systems
Engineering,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_engineering (last visited August 9, 2015).
121
A dismissal is not a “decision.”
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Assume further that S = 7.3 %; signifying that less than 10% of
pending hearings are decided by Senior Attorney Adjudicators
(SAAs) without a hearing.122 In considering the SAA number, “7.3

122

Congressional Response Report, The Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review’s Hearings Backlog and Processing Times, No. A-12-11-21192, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR
GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
(June
2011),
THE
file:///C:/Users/Eflow/Documents/Articles/Social%20Security%20Dinosaurs/OIG
%20Senior%20Atty%20Dispositions%20A-12-11-21192.pdf, which provides that
“[i]n FY 2010, SAAs issued 54,186 OTR [on the record, meaning, without hearing]
decisions, representing about 7.3 percent of all dispositions.” Id. at 6.
Following is an excerpt from Table 1: OIG Pending Hearings Backlog
Projections (Based on FY 2012 Budget). SAA dispositions are shown for Fiscal
Year 2010, with projections declining slightly through Fiscal Year 2013. Id. at
page 3. However, despite the small decline, the number is fairly consistent over
time, decisions by “Senior Attorney Adjudicators” (SAA’s) representing the only
other alternative by which to decide a case pending hearing before an ALJ.
Workloads/Staffing

SAA
Dispositions

FY2010
Actual
54,186

FY2011
Projected
53,200

FY2012
Projected
49,200

FY2013
Projected
48,600

That this is so, is evident from the full Table, shown below. Case dispositions
occur only by decisions by Administrative Law Judges, who, by reason of the rigid
single-track hearings procedure, may only decide a pending hearing by holding a
hearing; or by Senior Attorney Adjudicators who may only decide cases without a
hearing, and then, may only decide a pending hearing favorably. See SSA OIG
Audit Report, Effects of the Senior Attorney Adjudicator Program on Hearing
Workloads, A-12-13-23002, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
1 (June 2013). An adverse decision may only be made by an ALJ , which, as noted,
requires a hearing.
.
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%,” I make the simple point that even with the SAA activity, a
sizeable number of all pending hearings will be decided only after a
hearing. Now add in dismissals. 123 Using the numbers from calendar
year 2011 per the 2012 OIG report,124 administrative law judges
disposed of 740,000 pending hearings; of which 111,000 were
dismissals.125 And, while a dismissal is not a “decision,” it
nevertheless results in a case disposition. Thus, of the total number
of pending hearings resolved by administrative law judges, only 15%
were by reason of dismissal, that is, [744,000/111,000 = 15%.]
The point? The equation, R = H + S + D represents an inherent
rigidity in the disability hearings process. In effect the adjudicatory
process is frozen in place, unable to do more than it presently does,
resulting in a continuously rising backlog. In point of fact, the
hearings process is quickly submerging under a backlog of more than
1,000,000 pending hearings. It is a path that will bring us to the same
crossroads reached by the dinosaurs. Theirs was a path set in the
irreversible suction of the tar pits and the slow mire of antediluvian

123

This number does not include dismissals of the Request for Hearing, where
the claimant withdraws or abandons his/her Request or passes away. As noted by
the Office of Inspector General in a July 2010, “[w]e found that dismissal rates
varied among ODAR’s 10 regions. Specifically, dismissal rates ranged from a low
of 14 percent in the Dallas Region to a high of 23 percent in the Kansas City
Region . . .” See SSA OIG, Congressional Response Report, Hearing Request
Dismissals, A-07-10-21049, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 7
(July 2010),
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/summary/html/A-07-10-21049.html.
More precisely, “[i]n FY 2011, ODAR issued over 793,000 dispositions, of
which approximately 740,000 were issued by ALJs and over 53,000 were issued by
Attorney Adjudicators . . . Of the 740,000 dispositions issued by ALJs,
approximately 629,000 dispositions resulted in an allowance or denial decision and
the remaining 111,000 dispositions were dismissals of the hearing request. A
hearing request can be dismissed for a variety of reasons, including failure of the
claimant to appear at the hearing, the claimant choosing to withdraw the hearing
request, or death of the claimant. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.957, 416.1457.” See SSA,
OIG, Congressional Response Report, The Social Security Administration’s Review
of Administrative Law Judges’ Decisions, A-07-12-21234, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR
GEN.,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
1
n.3
(March
2012),
http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-07-12-21234.pdf.
124
Congressional Response Report, The Social Security Administration’s
Review of Administrative Law Judges’ Decisions, 1 n. 3.
125
Id.
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bogs. With no ability to adapt to a changing environment they
became extinct.
It need not be so for the Social Security Disability hearings and
appeals process.
Mr. Lankford
I’m glad to hear you say that Professor. But what can be done? I
am interested in a long-term pragmatic solution to the problem. I
catch your point. The “system,” as you so simply describe it, is, in
actuality a hidebound relic from a former age – when, as the Supreme
Court noted in the Perales case in 1971,126 only 20,000 cases were
pending on appeal nationwide; when only 19% of all claimants were
represented; and when the decision-maker was a “Hearing
Examiner,” committed to the disability appeals system as an agent of
social policy, and not as a “judge” committed to due process.
So, please, if you will, what is the solution?

Professor Smith
Even a quick glance at the formula leads one to conclude that the
only way to increase output in this system is to require the actors to
work harder – to decide more cases.
But, if we assume that the character of the cases does not change,
then “working harder” necessarily means less time on each case.
Even more significantly, “working harder” is further limited by the
number of hours in a competitive workday. My point – “working
harder” is, itself, inherently limited. Given the continuing increase in
applications for disability benefits, this equation represents, at best, a
temporary solution, not to mention the question whether reducing the
amount of time spent on a case is to effectively limit or even negate
required due process – an instance of the system overwhelming the
ideal.
Thus, R = H + S + D is destined to failure; as there is no external
factor inherently a part of the equation which allows for increases in
cases resolved beyond “working harder.” In other words, there is no
way for the current system to close the gap in the backlog, much less
stay apace. Close review reveals an interesting bias. R = H + S + D

126

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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is entirely one-sided. It effectively describes a closed system.
Resolution under this formula is dependent entirely upon activity
only able to be initiated by two ODAR actors – judges or senior
attorneys. For all intents and purposes, there is no decisional
pathway from the claimant to the judge, except to have a hearing.
More to the point, there is no mechanism in this closed-loop formula
which contemplates, much less encourages, case resolution initiated
by the claimant’s representative or the agency itself. Herein lies the
solution to what is otherwise a self-contained and thence, limited or
closed system.
Mr. Lankford
If I follow you, you’re saying that under the current system of
hearings before administrative law judges there is an absolute bar to a
higher disposition rate absent appointing more judges?
Professor Smith
That’s correct Congressman Lankford. I believe the solution is to
update the equation so that it no longer describes a closed system, but
an open architecture, embracing the Social Security Administration
as a “party” to the hearing before the administrative law judge. In
effect, bringing the Agency to the table where it has to this point
refused to be seated.
Mr. Issa
Isn’t the Agency a party to the disability hearing now?
Professor Smith
No, sir. It is not. The Agency has no representative at a
disability hearing and otherwise has constructed no pathway by
which a claimant or a claimant’s representative can communicate
with the Agency after a Request for Hearing has been submitted.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Perales,127 noted, the
role of the agency is largely that of adjudicator. The increasing
presence of lawyers as claimant’s representatives has necessarily
changed the hearings and appeals paradigm. As in any adjudicatory
system, there must be a mechanism for claims resolution apart from

127

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
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hearing. In the courts, this usually manifests itself in the ability of
both counsel to reach resolution by agreement, generally termed
“alternative dispute resolution.” This represents a degree of
adjudicatory flexibility which serves the much needed purpose of
venting steam, relieving pressure on an already overburdened court
system. No such relief valve exists in Social Security’s system of
hearings and appeals. Simply put, there is no representative of the
agency present with whom claimant’s counsel may confer.
Mr. Issa
What about the judge? Isn’t she a representative of the Agency?
Professor Smith
No sir.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act128 the
administrative law judge is a neutral and impartial decision-maker.
By definition, should the judge represent the Agency, she cannot be
impartial and the supposed neutral role of the judge is transformed
into fiction.
Mr. Issa
The bottom line professor?
Professor Smith
The necessity of a hearing in the overwhelming majority of cases,
increases the time to disposition, each case proceeding in lockstep
with no alternative but a hearing, apart from a Senior Attorney (SAA)
decision or judicial dismissal.
This mandate, effectively requiring more than seventy-eight
percent of all claims proceed to resolution only after a hearing, marks
a dramatic departure from the experience had in the various state and
federal court systems of the Nation. While the settlement rate
literature emphasizes that “the definition of what constitutes a
settlement is “critical” in studying settlement rates,”129 it clear from
several studies that relatively high settlement rates in the courts
(though variable, dependent on the type of case) diverge sharply from

128

5 U.S.C. A. §551(2011), et seq.
Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care? 6 J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 115 (March 2009).
129
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the single-track disability hearing procedure which, apart from the
limited actions of Senior Attorney Adjudicators, signals a hearing in
almost seventy-eight percent of all pending hearings.130
Specifically, I point to Clermont and Schwab’s report.131 They
compiled a “report of settlement rates . . . based on data on federal
court case terminations gathered by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (AO) from 1979 to 2006. They reported on both
employment discrimination cases and other civil cases and find that
about 70 percent of both groups of cases terminated by
settlement.”132 In other words, over a twenty-seven year period the
researchers concluded that 70% of civil cases filed in the United
States Courts were resolved without trial.
More to the point, the resolution of hearings pending before
ODAR is, as a result of an antiquated, inflexible hearing procedure,
effectively the mirror image of case resolution before the federal
courts. In other words, rather than resolve seventy percent of all
cases with no hearing, or with a least a limited hearing, ODAR
proceeds to a full hearing in seventy- eight percent of pending
appeals. Is it any wonder that there is a mounting backlog of pending
hearings?
Mr. Issa
Thank you, Professor. Very insightful. This will conclude the
current proceedings.

130

This number is reached by subtracting both the SAA OTR rate (7.3%) and
the dismissal rate (111,000/740,000 or 15%), leaving a remaining 77.7% of
pending hearings that must, for lack of any other pathway, proceed to hearing.
131
Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse? 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1
(2009), cited by Eisenberg and Lanvers, supra, note 128 at 44.
132
Id.
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X. AFTERWORD
On October 29, 2015, Congress passed the Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2015 (H.R.1314).133 Included within the Act are provisions
designed to alleviate the impending insolvency of the Social Security
Disability Insurance Trust Fund, scheduled before the Act’s passage
to exhaust all funds in the fourth quarter 2016.134 While seemingly
good news, the Act135 is but a stopgap. It neither addresses
significant underlying substantive issues, nor permanently resolves
already critical budget shortfalls.136 In a word, the Act “kicks Social
Security disability” down the road to the near future, taking what
might have been a critical 2016 election-year issue off the political
table, avoiding the so-called “Third Rail of American Politics.”137

133

See The Hon. James Lankford, United States Senator, Oklahoma, Senator
Lankford Offers Real Reforms to Social Security Disability Insurance Program,
LANKFORD
SENATE
PRESS
RELEASE
(October
29,
2015),
http://www.lankford.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-lankford-offers-realreforms-to-social-security-disability-insurance-program.
134
See Mark Schleifstein, Social Security Disability Pressure Eased by Budget
Compromise,
THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(October
30,
2015)
at
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/10/budget_compromise_includes_nee
.html, who writes:
But collections at that rate aren't adequate to pay all
disability beneficiaries by the third quarter of 2016. And the
Social Security trust fund, on which the main Social Security
benefit program relies, might be exhausted as early as 2034,
according to Congressional Research Service reports.”
135
The text of H.R. 1314 may be found at: House of Representatives, House
Bill 1314, U.S. CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/housebill/1314.
http://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20151026/BILLS-114hr-PIHBUDGET.pdf.
136
See, e.g., Robert Pear, Agreement is Seen as Short-Term Relief for
Medicare and Social Security, NEW YORK TIMES (October 27, 2015),
http://nyti.ms/1KE8O2b. (Observing, “AARP, a lobby for older Americans, praised
the agreement on Tuesday, though it said the legislation ‘will not provide a longterm solution to the funding challenge facing the Social Security disability
insurance trust fund.’”).
137
The “Third Rail” of American politics is a descriptor attributed to former
Speaker Tip O’Neill, made in response to proposed cuts to the Social Security
program by the Regan Administration. William Safire wrote in the New York
Times Magazine, saying, “[a]nyone who tries to touch it [Social Security] gets
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Rachel Greszler writing for The Daily Signal comments:
Congress has been kicking the can down the road on disability
insurance reform for decades, and 2016 should have been the end of
the road—time for meaningful reform. Instead, policymakers want to
provide a little more roadway for the disability insurance program by
whacking off a portion of Social Security’s roadway.138
Mike Flynn, writing for Breitbart is equally critical:
Next year, the disability trust fund will be completely exhausted.
Over the next ten years, the disability program faces a $256 billion
shortfall.
The . . . budget deal tries to duct-tape this shortfall. The deal
agreed to by the House transfers $150 billion from the Social
Security Trust Fund to plug the growing hole for disability payments.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Social Security program itself faces
serious solvency issues, the House budget again uses the Trust Fund
like a slush fund to paper over its own mistakes.
Rather than do the hard work of reforming a disability program
that has exploded and evolved into a de facto welfare program, the
House has chosen to kick the problem down the road.139
electrocuted.” William Safire, Third Rail, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (February 18, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/magazine/18wwlnsafire.t.html?_r=0.
See also Tom Keane, Touching the Third Rail of Politics: Democrats Balk at a
New Formula for Calculating Social Security, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 21, 2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2013/04/20/social-security-third-railpolitics/YWLU4kyHo6y8ivZJabCRMK/story.html (“Social Security has always
been the so-called ‘third rail’ of politics, and Democrats (and a fair number of
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Flynn writes further:
One of the more egregious acts is to take $150 Billion out of
the Social Security Trust Fund to prop up the program’s
disability benefits. The Social Security raid will keep the
disability program solvent through 2022, at which time Congress
is
likely
to
again
raid
the
federal
pension
program...Unsurprisingly, the disability program is running out
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The combined FICA allocation from both employers and
employees is 12.4%, each paying 6.2%. Of this, 1.8% is allocated to
the Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits Trust Fund.140 The
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 takes the current FICA allocation
from 1.8% to 2.37% for budget years 2016, 2017 and 2018, reverting
thereafter to 1.8%.141 The “fix” is effective in the short run, but
leaves open the question of future funding.
Substantive disability reforms were proposed by U.S. Senator
James Lankford of Oklahoma, including a proposal to end “double
dipping,” which at present allows persons to receive disability
benefits predicated on an inability to work, while simultaneously
collecting state unemployment benefits, available to those who are
looking for a job.142 Senator Lankford’s amendments (No. 2755),143
also include elimination of the “reconsideration” stage of the
disability determination process; thereby “speeding up” the appeals
process once initially denied.144 At present, a claimant must make an
initial application and if denied, seek “reconsideration” within sixty
days of the initial denial. Eliminating this second review potentially
shortens the overall appeals process.
Senator Lankford also proposed changes to the hearings and
appeals process before federal Administrative Law Judges, including
adoption of formal rules of procedure and tougher evidentiary
standards.145 At bottom, however, the 1950’s jurisprudential system
remains fundamentally untouched by Senator Lankford’s
amendments. Notably lacking is the keystone to needed evolutionary
of money. According to the recent Trustees report on Social
Security, the disability program pays out around $30 billion more
in benefits than it collects in taxes. Id.
140
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change, establishing a new role for the agency in disability hearings.
At present, some 1,500 federal Administrative Law Judges appointed
under the Administrative Procedure Act,146 now preside over de novo
disability appeals within the Office of Disability Adjudication and
Review. Absent a new role – as a “party” in disability hearings – the
agency continues its long-standing function as an adjudicator,147
forsaking all methods of dispute resolution save conduct of a hearing
in conformity with an outdated 1950’s quasi-inquisitorial
jurisprudence.148 This configuration effectively ensures an inability
to engage in the kind of flexible decisionmaking, discussed supra,
critical to resolution of the continuing and ever-growing backlog of
disability appeals from underlying administrative denials.
Simply put, it is the absence of jurisprudential flexibility which
effectively hobbles the current hearings and appeals process. Senator
Lankford’s amendments are important first steps, signaling the need
and the willingness for modernization of the current jurisprudence.
Social Security is no longer the “Third Rail of American Politics.” It
has become the “Magnet for American Reform,” preserving in its recasting, a lifeline for millions. The alternative is found among the
bones on display in museums across the nation.
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